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Corey delaHoussaye:
McLindon Challenges OIG Powers
For now, the criminal trial against Corey delaHoussaye remains technically
alive even though Judge Brenda Ricks ruled on February 23, 2015 that
insufficient evidence exists to proceed with a trial.
Mere minutes after Ricks’ ruling, Perrilloux angrily stated to
reporters that he would appeal Ricks’ ruling, and he added, “Just because they
wear a black robe doesn’t mean they know everything.”
True to his word, Perrilloux recently filed an appeal with the First
Circuit Court of Appeal seeking to overturn Ricks’ ruling and proceed with the
criminal trial.
On Monday, April 20, 2015, delaHoussaye’s attorney, John McLindon, argued before Judge Ricks a Motion to Suppress and Motion to Quash the evidence gathered by the IG on multiple fronts.
First, McLindon asserts that the IG is entitled to access the records only of
a “covered agency.”
Thus, IG access is limited to only executive branches of state
government, of which Livingston Parish, with whom delaHoussaye executed his
contract, clearly is not.
In an obvious admission that Livingston Parish is not a covered
agency, Greg Murphy, Assistant District Attorney, placed Ben Plaia, an attorney
for the Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
(GOHSEP), on the witness stand.
Murphy utilized Plaia’s testimony to buttress Murphy’s argument that,
because GOHSEP controls access to federal emergency funding and those funds flow
through it to the parish, that made delaHoussaye’s records fair game by virtue
of GOHSEP’s standing as a covered agency.
Essentially, Murphy argued that, by virtue of funds flowing through
GOHSEP, its own presumed covered agency status is imputed unto Livingston
Parish.
McLindon attacked that assertion during cross examination by asking Plaia a
series of questions.
When asked if GOHSEP, delaHoussaye, or C-Del (delaHoussaye’s company)
were covered agencies, Plaia responded, “I don’t know.”
Obviously, if GOHSEP isn’t a covered agency, nothing can be imputed,
and Plaia would not testify that GOHSEP is a covered agency.
When asked if
delaHoussaye or C-Del were contractors of a covered agency, Plaia again
responded, “I don’t know.”
Similarly, when asked if delaHoussaye or C-Del were subcontractors,
grantees, or subgrantees of a covered agency, Plaia again responded, “I don’t
know.”
When asked if GOHSEP had any contractors or subcontractors, Plaia indicated that
it did not.
When asked if it would be proper for GOHSEP to pay delaHoussaye or C-Del
directly if invoices seeking payment were submitted directly to GOHSEP, Plaia
responded, “No.
In fact, I believe it would be improper for us to do so.”
Based on Plaia’s testimony, not only was there no foundation to establish
that GOHSEP could impute any covered status unto Livingston Parish, but there
was no foundation for establishing that GOHSEP is even a covered agency with
anything to impute.
Nevertheless, taking no chances, McLindon continued to attack the IG’s
powers and authority even under the assumption that somehow covered status were
deemed to exist and be imputable to Livingston Parish.
In doing so, McLindon is not the first attorney to fire a shot across the bow
at the IG’s investigative powers and techniques.
In December of 2013, during the trial of Murphy Painter, former
Commissioner of the Alcohol and Tobacco Commission (ATC), both Mike Fawer and Al
Robert, Jr., Painter’s defense attorneys, sharply criticized the IG in terms of
overreach regarding search warrants and sloppy investigative techniques.
Robert asserted to Federal Judge James Brady that the IG’s execution
of the search warrant entailing Painter was both sloppy and that the agency
acted well beyond the authority the judge granted.
In perhaps the most stunning quote of the entire trial, Robert,
outside the presence of the jury, stated to Judge Brady, “Your Honor, this is
not the FBI!
This is the OIG!
These people do not know what they’re doing!”
Similarly, when Fawer had IG investigator Shane Evans on the witness stand,
he asked him to confirm his notes documenting that ATC officer Brant Thompson
indicated Painter was “out of control, manic-depressive, and selectively
enforcing alcohol statutes.” Evans confirmed that Thompson made those statements
to him.
Fawer then asked Evans what investigative procedures he used to substantiate
Thompson’s allegations against Painter.
Evans stated that he’d performed no investigative procedures at all
and instead that he “merely wrote down what Thompson said.”
Fawer then inquired, “And based on your notations, my client (Painter)
was summoned to the Governor’s Office later that evening, and he was fired by
the Governor, wasn’t he?”
Evans responded that it was his understanding that Painter had
resigned, to which Fawer responded, “Resigned, fired, whatever the case.
The bottom line is that very evening my client was out of a job all
based on a few notes you wrote down with no attempt whatsoever to substantiate
what you wrote, correct?”
Evans, who has left the IG and now serves as an investigator for the
EBRP Coroner’s Office, didn’t challenge Fawer’s assertion.
McLindon takes Fawer and Robert’s assertions a step
further and indicates his firm belief that the IG has no search warrant
authority at all.
He argues that the Louisiana Legislature specifically granted the IG
subpoena power but was silent on search warrant authority.
He said that fact, combined with the fact that, for criminal matters,
“statutes are to be given a narrow interpretation and any ambiguity resolved in
favor of the accused,” (the Doctrine of Lenity) means that the IG has no search
warrant authority.
McLindon said that, prior to this case, nobody has ever challenged the
IG on its search warrant authority, but he is formally doing so in this case and
seeks for Ricks to make a formal ruling on whether they have such authority.
Murphy countered that Ricks must believe the IG has the authority to
execute search warrants since she signed one dated June 21, 2011.
He then provided a copy to Judge Ricks, to which she responded, “You
went way back to find that one, didn’t you?”
Next, even if covered status is somehow deemed to exist for Livingston Parish
and search warrant authority is deemed by the court to be vested unto the IG,
McLindon next argued that the IG failed to conform to the statutory requirement
regarding an added step for subpoenas sought by the IG.
Specifically, McLindon argued the statute says that the judge
shall issue a written decision
within 72 hours of the application for the subpoena.
McLindon indicated that the IG and prosecutor have taken the position
that the Motion for the Search Warrant is the decision, but McLindon counters
that the motion is merely the application.
Furthermore, he stressed heavily that the Legislature could have
granted unfettered subpoena power to the IG in the same manner as that which
exists for the Attorney General, but it intentionally meant to provide an added
layer of review in the case of the IG.
McLindon argued that the IG has been wrong to merely ignore that added
layer as it has historically done.
Again, McLindon argued nobody has challenged the IG on this
requirement, but he’s doing so in this case.
McLindon concluded his arguments by indicating that failure to suppress the
evidence obtained by the IG for the reasons he argues “gives agencies carte
blanche to engage in fishing expeditions into the private, sensitive information
of citizens.”
In yet another added challenge to IG authority on obtaining its evidence,
McLindon cited a case, State v. Skinner, in which the Louisiana Supreme Court
made clear the need for a warrant,
and not a mere subpoena, to obtain an individual’s medical records.
McLindon thus seeks for delaHoussaye’s medical records indicating he
was visiting a physician during a timeframe that the IG alleges he reported
working to also be suppressed.
He seeks such suppression based upon the IG obtaining the records via
subpoena rather than a warrant.
Readers are invited to
read McLindon's full post-trial memo
outlining his arguments.
the authority to issue search warrants. She further ruled that, again in siding with McLindon, that the IG failed to follow the mandate of the statute that a written decision be issued by a judge regarding granting the authority to issue a subpoena when the IG’s Office is making the request. Accordingly, she granted the request to suppress all of the evidence obtained by the IG’s Office during the outrageous raid on delaHoussaye’s home. Perrilloux has appealed that ruling of Judge Ricks as well. It will be interesting to see how the First Circuit rules on all the matters pending before it, and Perrilloux has requested an expedited hearing.
Sound Off Louisiana has interviewed several attorneys about the wisdom of the Louisiana Legislature granting the IG law enforcement authority even with the provision of no arrest powers, silence on search warrant authority, and an added hurdle for subpoenas which McLindon asserts has historically been simply ignored by the IG. The consensus among the attorneys with whom Sound Off Louisiana has interviewed on the subject is that the Legislature made a serious mistake and that the IG is often abusing its power and, in at least some instances, acting in a reckless manner. Don't be surprised to see a push in the 2016 legislative session to abolish the IG's Office and, if it materializes, the IG can blame its own wild west tactics for its demise.